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Does market exit of a network airline affect airline 
prices and frequencies on tourist routes? 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the influence of network airline bankruptcy (and 
consequently its market exit) on prices and route frequencies. Specifically, the 2011 case of 
Spanair is analyzed, using Spanish route data for the period 2006-2013. The study finds that 
the Spanair bankruptcy led to a reduction in prices on those routes where its services were 
replaced by low-cost airlines. On the other hand, there was no evidence of any clear 
reduction in flight frequencies. Given that tourist passengers are particularly sensitive to 
prices, this paper provide evidence about the positive impact of low-cost airlines on 
tourism. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of previous studies have shown a strong relationship between transport 
infrastructure and tourism (Chew, 1987; Martin & Witt, 1988; Abeyratne, 1993; Khadaroo 
and Seetanah, 2007, 2008; Della Corte et al., 2013). Indeed, transportation acts as one of 
the main determinants of tourist destination as it improves accessibility to a particular 
location. A large proportion of tourists arrive at their final destination by plane so it is not 
surprising to find that air services have a high impact on the number of tourist arrivals 
(Bieger and Wittmer, 2006; Dobruszkes and Mondou, 2013, Albalate and Fageda, 2016). 
Thus, entries and exists in the airline market may have significant implications for 
tourism. Here it is important to mention that the air transport market is dominated by two 
different types of airlines. First, network carriers exploit transfer traffic through 
coordinated banks of arrivals and departures at their hub airports. These network airlines 
are usually former flag carriers and are frequently a part of international alliances. By 
adopting this strategy they are able to reduce their costs through the exploitation of density 
economies, and can offer greater flight frequency, which are highly valued by business and 
connecting passengers (Fageda, 2013). 
Second, low-cost airlines operate point-to-point routes. They may be independent 
airlines or subsidiaries of network airlines but they are usually not integrated in 
international alliances. Low-cost airlines have been able to reduce their expenditure to 
compete with network airlines on short-haul routes (Francis et al., 2007). These cost 
advantages come from greater productivity of capital and labour due to the weak role of 
unions and high utilisation of the planes and crew. Furthermore, they use one type of plane 
configured with the maximun number of seats so that they have lower labour costs and 
maintenance. They also take advantage of easy daily management as they operate direct 
fligths and do not differentiate between different fare classes. Finally, some leading low-
cost airlines like Ryanair choose secondary airports and therefore enjoy low charges and 
minimal congestion. 
Overall, we may expect that low-cost airlines offer flights at lower prices and lesser 
frequencies than network airlines (Fageda and Flores-Fillol, 2012). This may have 
consequences for the type of passenger to which network and low-cost airlines offer their 
services. Given that most trips are made in order to undertake an activity at destination, the 
demand for transportation services depends not only on the monetary price of the trip but 
also on the travel time, since the latter implies a disutility for the transport user (Button, 
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2010). The sensitivity of business passengers to time is much higher than that of leisure 
passengers. In this regard, an increase in frequency should reduce waiting time, which is 
calculated as the difference between the desired and real time of departure. Thus, we may 
expect that low-cost airlines services are more convenient for leisure passengers while 
network airlines are better for business passengers. Recent studies provide evidence about 
the strong effect that low-cost airlines have on tourist outcomes (Donzelli, 2010; Chung 
and Wang, 2011; Rey et al., 2011) 
This paper examines an event that may help in identifying the differential impact of low-
cost and network airlines on prices and frequencies offered on air routes. Specifically it 
analyses the case of Spanair, which was a network airline (integrated in the Star alliance) 
developing hub-and-spoke operations at Barcelona airport in 2011 when it was made 
bankrupt. Most its services were replaced by low-cost airlines such as Ryanair and/or 
Vueling although on some routes Spanair was also competing with network airlines like the 
former Spanish flag carrier (Iberia, integrated in Oneworld) or Air Europa (integrated in 
SkyTeam). 
By drawing on data for a large number of Spanish routes for the period 2006-2013, 
price and frequency equations are estimated, controlling for demand, cost shifters and 
route competition. Similar control variables as those used in previous studies regarding 
prices and frequencies in the airline market are employed. Studies like those of Borenstein 
(1989), Brander and Zhang (1990), Evans and Kessides (1993), Brueckner and Spiller 
(1994), Marín (1995), Dresner et al. (1996), Berry et al. (1996), Morrison (2001), Fisher and 
Kamerschen (2003), Fageda (2006), Hofer et al. (2008), and Oum et al. (1993) estimate how 
prices are influenced by route competition, airport dominance, or the presence of low-cost 
carriers. In a similar vein, Borenstein and Netz (1999), Schipper et al. (2002), Salvanes et al. 
(2005), Wei and Hansen (2007), Brueckner and Pai (2009), Pai (2010), and Bilotkach et al. 
(2010) examine the effect of factors such as route distance, competition, or aircraft size on 
flight frequencies. 
The particular contribution of this paper is that it identifies the differential impact on 
prices and frequencies of low-cost airlines in relation to network airlines, as it exploits 
information generated by the bankruptcy of a network airline. In this regard, the estimation 
is made within the framework of a panel data analysis where frequencies and prices on 
routes operated by Spanair are compared with routes that are not affected by the 
bankruptcy (because they were not previously operated by Spanair). Among the routes 
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affected by the Spanair bankruptcy, a distinction is drawn between tourist and non-tourist 
routes, and only those routes where low-cost airlines were operating services after the 
bankruptcy are identified. Hence, this study is able to specifically analyze the replacement 
of services of a network airline by low-cost airlines on tourist routes. 
As far as we know, only one previous paper has undertaken a similar analysis, but in a 
market where travel for tourism is more modest than in that analyzed in this study. 
Bilotkach et al. (2014) analyzed the effects of the Malev bankruptcy at its hub, Budapest, 
where its services were replaced by low-cost airlines (Ryanair and Wizzair). The authors 
identified a significant reduction in flight frequency that was not totally compensated for by 
lower fares on a number of routes. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the variables included in the 
empirical analysis, the expected signs and the data used, while section three provides details 
of the estimation and results. The final section is devoted to the concluding remarks. 
2. Data and variables 
This study draws on data from 80 routes in 30 different airports. The frequency of the 
data is semi-annual, as we differentiate between summer and winter seasons in a period that 
starts in the summer of 2006 and finishes in the winter of 2013. The market exit of Spanair 
occurred in 2011, so the data contain observations for 12 seasons before exit and 3 periods 
after the exit. The average market share of Spanair on routes reached 32 per cent, while the 
range was between 7 and 100 per cent. 
The two dependent variables in our models are prices and frequencies. Price 
information was collected for a sample week for each half year during the period. We 
considered the lowest mean round trip price charged by all airlines operating the route, 
weighted by their corresponding market share. The data were collected from the airlines’ 
websites using a homogeneous procedure: every half year prices were collected one month 
before travelling and the price selected was for the first flight of the week, with the return 
leg being on a Sunday. Although prices by route and airline change substantially on a 
monthly/weekly basis, the price data are considered to be reliable. Data are collected at the 
same time for all airlines and routes, and by imposing the same conditions on all airlines 
and routes we can be confident in the data variability attributable to the differences 
between routes. We have collected data manually and in all cases we have identified the 
price for a round trip flight with the same airline. Finally, prices are corrected for inflation. 
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Frequency variable shows the weekly number of flights offered by the airlines on 
each route. This information was obtained from the Official Airlines Guide (OAG) website 
and refers to the same sample week as prices. 
Before detailing the empirical strategy, the following tables include some descriptive 
analysis that uses changes in average data on the two dependent variables considered: 
frequencies and weighted prices. In order to do so, we also differentiate between non-
tourist (table 1, 2 and 3) and tourist routes (table 4, 5 and 6). 
The differentiation between tourist and non-tourist routes has been made on the 
basis of a document by the Spanish antitrust authority (CNMC, 2014). In this report, a 
tourist airport is defined as an airport with a high level of national and international 
competition, a high proportion of low cost carriers or being close to a tourist destination, 
among others. In our database we included 9 out of 30 airports considered.1  
The tables below show an analysis of average data for those routes in which Spanair 
operated (and did not), and also take into account the before-and-after change. The key 
questions we seek to address are: did frequencies and weighted prices change after Spanair's 
exit on the routes where it operated? Are low cost-carriers operating on all routes in the 
same way? Are these changes the same on tourist and non-tourist routes?  
Firstly, table 1 illustrates this analysis for frequency on non-tourist routes: 
                                                 
1 These airports are: Málaga, Alicante, Palma de Mallorca, Tenerife Sur, Gran Canaria, Mahón 
(Menorca), Ibiza, Arrecife (Lanzarote) and Fuerteventura. 
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Table 1. Changes in total average frequency. Non-tourist routes 
 
ROUTE 
With Spanair Without Spanair 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
Before 9.19 (0.83) 5.07 (0.43) 
After 8.27 (1.73) 2.84 (0.34)** 
Source: Own elaboration. * indicates that the t-test between before and after shows statistical 
significance. 
 
As average data show, frequency diminishes on both routes in the period after 
Spanair's exit, but also on routes where Spanair did not operate (the t-test shows statistical 
significance). The same analysis for average weighted prices is included in table 2. 
Table 2. Changes in weighted prices. Non-tourist routes 
 
ROUTE 
With Spanair Without Spanair 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
Before 143.84 (6.52) 180.53 (6.38) 
After 160.05 (15.99) 171.90 (17.24) 
Source: Own elaboration. * indicates that the t-test between before and after shows statistical 
significance. 
 
In this case, prices increase in those routes where Spanair operated while they 
decrease in those where it did not operate. These results may be interpreted as a negative 
effect for consumers of Spanair's exit, although no statistical significance in the 'before-
and-after' is found on either type of routes. 
Regarding changes in the presence of low-cost carriers on routes, which will be a 
variable taken into account later, table 3 is constructed on the basis of the percentage of 
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routes operated only by low-cost carriers. It can be seen that almost half of the routes 
where Spanair was offering services are now operated uniquely by low-cost airlines 
following the bankruptcy of the former airline. 
Table 3. Percentage of routes operated only by low-cost carriers. Non-tourist 
routes 
 
ROUTE 
With Spanair Without Spanair 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
Before 0 out of 15 (0%) 0 out of 27 (0%) 
After 6 out of 13 (46%) 5 out of 18 (28%) 
Source: Own elaboration. We compare routes in 2010 (before) and 2013 (after). Total routes are not the 
same, due to it not being a balance panel database. 
 
Meanwhile tables 4 to 6 replicate previous average analysis but for tourist routes. 
Table 4 focuses on average frequency. 
Table 4. Changes in total average frequency. Tourist routes 
 
ROUTE 
With Spanair Without 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
Before 8.76 (0.50) 4.37 (0.28) 
After 8.59 (0.83) 2.74 (0.27)* 
Source: Own elaboration. * indicates that the t-test between before and after show statistical 
significance. 
 
Frequency decreased for both types of routes, as in the previous case. Nevertheless 
the reduction is greater in those routes without Spanair than in the treated group. The table 
also shows statistical significance for the t-test.  
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Table 5 includes data on prices for these tourist routes. 
 
Table 5. Changes in weighted prices. Tourist routes 
 
ROUTE 
With Spanair Without 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
Before 163.84 (8.38) 176.60 (7.36) 
After 190.01 (21.39)* 197.71 (17.25) 
Source: Own elaboration. * indicates that the t-test between before and after shows statistical 
significance. 
 
In this case, weighted prices increased on both types of routes, although statistical 
significance is found only on those routes where Spanair was operating.  
Finally, table 6 shows the percentage of routes operated only by low-cost carriers. 
Data in this table indicate that around one third of the routes where Spanair was offering 
services are operated only by low-cost airlines following the bankruptcy of the former 
airline. 
Table 6. Percentage of routes operated only by low-cost carriers. Tourist 
routes 
 
ROUTE 
With Spanair Without Spanair 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
Before 0 out of 14 (0%) 2 out of 19 (10%) 
After 4 out of 14 (28%) 8 out of 17 (47%) 
Source: Own elaboration. We compare routes in 2010 (before) and 2013 (after). Total routes are not the 
same, due to it not being a balance panel database. 
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In sum, frequencies have decreased on those routes where Spanair did not operate, 
while prices increased on all routes, both in tourist and non-tourist routes. However these 
results may reflect the impact of Spanair's bankruptcy, but they must be analyzed with 
caution; being descriptive, they do not account for supply or demand factors and a causal 
analysis must be undertaken. This causal analysis is implemented in the estimation of the 
next equations. 
Frequency equation: The estimation of the frequency equation for route i at time t takes 
the following form: 
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Pricing equation: The price of the route i at time t is approximated by the following 
equation: 
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 [2] 
The dependent variable in the frequency equation Fit is the total number of flights 
that take place on the route i in the period t, while the dependent variable in the pricing 
equation Pit is the weighted prices on the route i in the period t (weight is calculated by 
frequency data by each airline on route). We use the following control variables in both 
equations: 
1. Air passengersit-1: the number of air passenger carried in those operations in the route i 
during year t-1. 'Number of passengers' was obtained from the website of the Spanish 
Airports and Air Navigation Agency (AENA) and is the number of passengers carried by 
airlines on a particular route, including direct and connecting flights.  
We applied a one-period lag under the assumption that airlines modify their behaviour 
by taking into account what happened in the previous period. But this variable may be 
showing an endogenous relationship with the explained variable. So we have implemented 
an instrumental variable in the estimation of frequency and price equations through the 
following variables: 
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1.a. Touristsjt: the number of yearly passengers in the destination city j during period t. 
Source: AENA. 
1.b. GDP per capitajt: Gross Domestic Product per inhabitant (annual data) for the 
destination city j during period t. Source: INE. 
1.c. Populationjt: Population at destination j during period t. Source: INE. 
The expected sign of the coefficient of Air passengers in the frequency equation is 
positive. It will be the strongest influence variable on the airlines’ frequency decisions, since 
supply must adjust to the levels of demand. In the pricing equation, however, the expected 
sign is ambiguous. More traffic on a route means it is possible to gain density economies, 
and in a competitive environment, this should lead to lower prices. However, a higher level 
of traffic might lead to higher mark-ups if capacity constraints are present. 
2. DiD variables. Three variables are included in order to control the exit effect of 
Spanair on the endogenous variable, known as DiD (that is, difference-in-difference analysis). 
Firstly, a binary variable that takes value 1 if all the companies that served the route were 
Low Cost Carriers (DiDOnlyLCC). Recall that low-cost airlines may be offering services at 
lower prices and lower frequencies than network carriers. 
Secondly, a binary variable that takes value 1 if the route was after the market exit of 
Spanair and was operating on it, in a non-tourist airport (DiDnontourist) and in a tourist 
airport (DiDTourist). These variables show us the relative change of these treated routes 
regarding the control group (Routes without Spanair). 
3. Aftert: binary variable that takes value 1 after the exit of Spanair, in all routes. 
Aircraft_sizeit: Mean size of the aircrafts used on the route. We expect a negative sign in 
the pricing equation. For a given capacity, airlines may exploit density economies by using 
larger aircrafts. Hence, they may use more efficient aircrafts in terms of the consumption of 
fuel. Furthermore, they may be able to achieve higher load factors as the capacity is offered 
with lower frequencies. The latter also implies that we can expect a negative sign of the 
aircraft size variable in the frequency equation.  
4. HHIit: herfindhal-hirschamn index on frequencies by route i at period t. This variable 
tries to evaluate the level of concentration at route i at period t. We expected a negative 
sign in the frequency equation, since fewer flights will be offered, as less competition exists 
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in the route. Otherwise, a positive coefficient is expected in the price equation, since less 
competition should result in higher prices being charged. HHI is computed as the sum of 
the square in terms of flight frequencies, whose information has been obtained from OAG.  
5. Seasont: binary variable that takes value 1 if data is in the winter season, to take into 
account differences across seasons. The dummy variable for the season was constructed on 
the understanding that the summer season starts on the last Sunday of March and finishes 
on the last Saturday of October, both inclusive. 
6. LCC’ shareit: these covariates evaluate the market share of frequency of flights of the 
low-cost carrier on the route i during period t. We expect a negative sign both in the price 
and frequency equations given that low-cost airlines usually operate with lower prices and 
frequencies than other carriers. Source: Own elaboration. 
7. 
 
D
it
HSR : binary variable that takes value 1 after the entrance of High Speed Rail (HSR) 
on route i during period t. This variable is included for negative effects on airlines 
frequencies, as described by Jiménez and Betancor (2012). In the price equation we expect 
a negative relationship, because more intermodal competition that generates lower prices is 
possible. 
In the following table the main descriptive statistics of our database can be seen. 
 
Table 7. Main variables in the database and descriptive statistics 
Explanatory variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Frequency 7.14 7.72 1 86 
Weighted price 169 94 27 680 
Passengers 478,861 581,970 8,832 4,842,969 
GDP per capita (average) 24,547 2,129 17,842 32,457 
Tourists (destination) 5,684,942 3,887,568 154,989 1.5 e7 
Population (average) 3,061,169 992,292 1,001,062 6,017,656 
DiD OnlyLCC 0.014 - 0 1 
DiD NonTourist 0.017 - 0 1 
DiD Tourist 0.022 - 0 1 
HHI 0.62 0,27 0,18 1 
Season 0.44 - 0 1 
Aircraft Size 127.84 48.76 43 207 
LCC’ share 0.27 0.29 0 1 
DHSR 0.10 - 0 1 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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3. Estimations and results 
This study has estimated frequency and pricing equations by an instrumental variable 
procedure in a panel data setting. As we previously explained the demand variable might be 
endogenous and we have to take this fact into account to eliminate any possible bias in the 
estimation using the two-stage squares estimator. Furthermore, we perform the estimation 
using a technique that takes advantage of the panel nature of our data: the route fixed 
model. The use of this model allows us to consider unobserved route heterogeneity. 
 In this regard, a clear advantage of the fixed effects model is that it allows us to 
control for any omitted variables that correlate with the variables of interest, which do not 
change over time. As such, the fixed effects model is more reliable than other estimation 
techniques. A shortcoming of the fixed effects model is that the effect of time-invariant 
variables like distance cannot be identified. However, the fixed effects will capture the 
impact on prices and frequencies related with distance and time-invariant variables that are 
not observable. 
The main results of the frequency equation are shown in the next table. The first 
column shows the results for the whole dataset but excluding the variable of LCC share on 
the route; the second includes this variable and the final column restricts the estimation 
only for a balanced panel. We report results of these three different specifications to check 
whether the results for the difference-in-difference variables may be affected by the LCC 
share variable or missing observations. 
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Table 8. Frequency equation using panel data estimations with instrumental 
variables 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Passengers 2e-5 (6e-6)*** 2e-5 (6e-6)*** 3e-5 (7e-6)*** 
DiD only LCC -1.07 (2.01) -1.25 (2.01) -1.41 (2.20) 
DiD Tourist 2.67 (1.31)** 2.70 (1.31)** 2.89 (1.47)** 
DiD Non-tourist 0.74 (1.64) 0.78 (1.65) 1.07 (1.81) 
After -0.77 (0.69) -0.82 (0.70) -0.87 (0.83) 
Aircraft Size -0.04 (0.01)** -0.04 (0.01)** -0.04 (0.01)** 
HHI -4.43 (0.90)*** -4.40 (0.91)*** -4.71 (1.10)*** 
Season -0.35 (0.27) -0.37 (0.27) -0.47 (0.34) 
HSR entrance -0.83 (1.37) -0.78 (1.37) -0.50 (1.64) 
LCC’s share  0.47 (0.72) 0.32 (0.87) 
Observations 784 784 640 
Sample All All 
Only routes with all 
data (balanced panel) 
Under / Over 
identification tests for 
instruments 
22*** / 2.4 22*** / 2.5 20.5*** / 2.8 
F Test 17.54*** 15.77*** 12.76*** 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors in brackets. 
Note 2: The passenger variable has been estimated using the following instruments: average GDP, 
tourists at destination, average population, and binary variables at Madrid and Barcelona's airports. 
Note 3. The under-identification test is the Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic and the over-
identification test is the Sargan test.  
 
Results show that the difference-in-difference variable for tourist routes is positive 
and statistically significant, so that the change in frequencies is higher in routes previously 
operated by Spanair (treated routes) than in the routes not affected by the exit of Spanair 
(control routes). Having said this, the coefficient is negative (although not statistically 
significant) when we consider routes where only LCC are offering services after the 
bankruptcy of Spanair.. Overall, these results confirm that LCC operate with lower 
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frequencies than network airlines although the result is not strong enough to reach 
statistical significance. Furthermore, frequencies have even increased in tourist routes 
affected by the exit of Spanair so that  the bankruptcy of the network airline does not seem 
to have had negative implications for passengers, at least in terms of flight frequencies..  
If we examine the control variables we can see that in general they have the expected 
signs. Number of passengers is positive and significant at one percent level. Note also that 
tests for this variable confirm that the instruments are strong and exogenous. Otherwise 
frequencies are smaller on routes with a greater level of concentration. The coefficient of 
the HSR and LCC’s share variables are negative (as expected) but not statistically 
significant. The binary variable After do not show statistical significance and the Aircraft size 
is negative. Finally, neither is the season variable statistically significant. Results for the 
pricing equation are presented in table 9. 
In the case of pricing equation the difference-in-difference estimator for routes 
where only LCC offer services is negative and statistically significant. Hence, we find 
evidence that the replacement of services of a network carrier (in this case Spanair) by low-
cost airlines (Ryanair or Vueling) has led to a reduction in prices. So that tourist passengers 
has even take benefit from the bankruptcy of Spanair due to they are generally sensitive to 
prices. In contrast, prices are higher for the other difference-in-difference variables, so that 
prices are higher after the bankruptcy of Spanair regardless of whether they are on tourist 
or non-tourist routes. 
Regarding the three difference-in-difference variables, the coefficient of the LCC 
variable is higher than those of the two other variables. Hence, both in tourist and non-
tourist routes, prices are lower if Spanair services are substituted by low-cost carriers. In 
contrast, those routes where Spanair services were replaced by network airlines like Iberia 
or Air Europa prices are higher. Thus, we find evidence that what makes a difference is the 
type of airline that has substituted Spanair services (ie; a low-cost airline or a network 
airline), while the type of route (ie; tourist or non-tourist) has not affected price changes 
after the bankruptcy of Spanair.  
The control variables present in general the expected signs. We find a positive effect 
of the number of passengers so that prices are higher on denser routes. This means that the 
mark-up effect is stronger than the density economies effect. Again, tests for this variable 
confirm that the instruments are strong and exogenous. Furthermore, the HHI variable is 
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positive and statistically significant so that prices are higher on routes with weaker 
competition. Furthermore, we find a negative effect of the LCC’s share variable and the 
season variables, so that prices are lower when the presence of LCC on the route is 
stronger and in the winter. Finally, the HSR is negative, as literature suggests, but not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 9. Pricing equation using panel data estimations with instrumental variables 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Passengers 3e-4 (1e-4)** 3e-4 (1e-4)** 3e-4 (1e-4)** 
DiD only LCC -128.43 (44.29)*** -105.40 (41.85)** -102.14 (41.02)** 
DiD Tourist 94.74 (33.80)*** 93.09 (32.28)*** 92.65 (31.88)*** 
DiD Non-tourist 89.30 (40.29)** 86.13 (38.43)** 87.57 (37.73)** 
After -5.13 (20.9) 3.89 (20.1) 3.62 (20.2) 
Aircraft Size -1.23 (0.39)*** -0.56 (0.38) -0.68 (0.37)* 
HHI 64.56 (23.88)** 57.42 (22.73)** 37.36 (23.80) 
Season -39.96 (7.00)*** -38.12 (6.68)*** -42.24 (7.16)*** 
HSR entrance 43.02 (30.77) 44.38 (29.45) 41.54 (30.78) 
LCC’s share  -83.52 (19.19)*** -81.01 (19.05)*** 
Observations 626 626 535 
Sample All All 
Only routes with all 
data (balanced panel) 
Under / Over 
identification tests for 
instruments 
28.7*** / 1.22 29.96*** / 0.51 27.23*** / 0.56 
F Test 6.29*** 7.57*** 7.68*** 
Note 1: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10% significance test. Standard errors in brackets. 
Note 2: The passenger variable has been estimated using the following instruments: average GDP, 
tourists at destination, average population, and binary variables at Madrid and Barcelona's airports. 
Note 3. The under-identification test is the Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic and the over-
identification test is the Sargan test.  
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4. Conclusions 
This paper has shown that the bankruptcy of Spanair has led to a reduction in prices on 
those routes where its services were replaced by low-cost airlines. In contrast, we do not 
find a clear reduction in frequencies. Given that tourists are particularly sensitive to prices, 
we find evidence that the replacement of services of a network airline by low-cost airlines 
has benefits in terms of the promotion of tourism. 
In Europe, low-cost airlines have developed an extensive network of routes and they 
operate in different types of airports including large and small airports and airports located 
in big cities or tourist destinations. In contrast, network airlines have increasingly 
concentrated their services in their hub airports. Hence, they run short-haul flights simply 
to feed the hubs where they offer a wide range of non-stop long-haul flights. To date, low-
cost airlines have become dominant on short-haul flights while network airlines are still 
competitive on long-haul flights. 
The results of this paper suggest that the dominance of low-cost airlines in intra-
European routes may have helped to promote tourism within Europe as low-cost airlines 
are able to offer services at lower prices than network airlines. Hence, we provide evidence 
about the positive impact of low-cost airlines on tourism. 
Currently, there is a concern among managers of network airlines about the increasing 
presence of low-cost airlines at their hubs and the expansion of low-cost airline services on 
long-haul flights. However, the results of our analysis suggest that government intervention 
to support hub-and-spoke operations is not justified as the cheap air tickets that low-cost 
airlines are able to offer may allow the expansion of tourist activities, with positive knock-
on effects in terms of economic growth.  
In fact, most of airports located at tourist destinations are managed by state-owned 
agencies. Such agencies may have as an objective to spur tourism at their sites. To this 
point, airport managers have different tools to attract low-cost airlines in order to support 
tourism growth.  
First, low-cost airlines are more sensitive than network airlines to airport charges. 
Hence, airports that set low airport charges (or discounts over regular charges) may have 
more opportunities to attract low cost carriers. Second, low-cost airlines are less willing to 
pay for auxiliary facilities like fingers. Thus, airports with cheap aprocedures for embark 
and disembark passengers may be more attractive for low-cost airlines. Furthermore, low-
18 
cost airlines grounds their profitability on a high utilization of the planes and the crew so 
that airports should not be congested if they want to attract them. Finally, joint marketing 
initiatives between the airport and low-cost airlines may can also be helpful.     
19 
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